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INTRODUCTION
A man opens fire in the parking lot of his former employer,
killing one former coworker and injuring another, in retaliation for
having been fired.' The prosecutor allows him to plead guilty to first-
degree murder in exchange for a life sentence.2 Another man beats
and strangles to death a young, disabled woman for no apparent
reason, and he, too, pleads guilty in exchange for a life sentence.3 Yet
1. Shannon Blosser, PPG Shooter Pleads Guilty to First-Degree Murder, SHELBY
STAR (Shelby, N.C.), Sept. 9, 2003, available at http://www.shelbystar.com/story.php?ID
=7949 (describing the case of Brandon Michael Smith).
2. Id.
3. Shannon Blosser, Autopsy: Woman Strangled, SHELBY STAR (Shelby, N.C.), Dec.
24, 2003, available at http://www.shelbystar.com/story.php?ID=8854 (describing the case of
Teddy Brian Scism); Megan Ward, Scism Pleads Guilty, SHELBY STAR (Shelby, N.C.),
Apr. 12, 2005, available at http://www.shelbystar.com/story.php?ID=14040 (same).
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another man shoots and kills two people,4 and although the
prosecutor charges him with two counts of first-degree murder, he
decides not to pursue the death penalty.' Finally, a man high on
cocaine enters a convenience store unarmed, intending to rob it.6
When the clerk resists, he grabs the closest weapon, a tire iron from
under the counter, and hits her with it, and'the clerk dies from the
blow.7 The prosecutor in his case seeks the death penalty and gets it.8
The differences in charging decisions in these cases, all
occurring within the same jurisdiction, might seem surprising. After
all, the death penalty is supposed to be reserved for only the "most
heinous crimes."9 Of the crimes described above, the last is arguably
the least heinous, and yet it was the only one of the four in which the
district attorney's office sought the death penalty. These differences
result from the near total discretion vested in prosecutors in the
United States. Although each case involved different facts and
circumstances, each was at the very least a death-eligible crime. Such
inconsistent and surprising outcomes reflect the disturbing potential
for arbitrary imposition of the death penalty when one prosecutorial
office, and often one single person, is responsible for such a grave
decision.
The United States Supreme Court has long been concerned
about the role of discretion in the imposition of the death penalty, in
particular the possibility that unchecked discretion can lead to
arbitrary and inconsistent application of the penalty. Such a result is
impermissible under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment.1" In its most prominent decisions about the
constitutionality of the death penalty, the Court focused on the
discretion state statutes then afforded to juries in capital cases. In
1972, the Court's per curiam opinion in Furman v. Georgia
invalidated the death penalty as it existed in every state in the
country. 1 Every member of the Court filed a separate opinion, with
each of the five concurring justices concluding that the arbitrary
4. Joy Scott, Suspects Sought in Three Homicides, SHELBY STAR (Shelby, N.C.), Oct.
1, 2002, available at http://www.shelbystar.com/story.php?ID=4652 (describing the case of
Travis James Lattimore).
5. Blosser, supra note 1.
6. Associated Press, Gov. Easley Denies Clemency, SHELBY STAR (Shelby, N.C.),
Mar. 11, 2005, available at http://www.shelbystar.com/story.php?ID=13625 (describing the
case of William Dillard Powell).
7. Id.
8. Id. (describing Powell's preparation for his execution).
9. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 286 (1972) (per curiam).
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.
932 [Vol. 85
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
manner in which states then imposed the death penalty violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.'2
Despite writing separately, the concurring justices agreed that state
laws violated the Eighth Amendment by granting juries unfettered
discretion to determine which crimes and which defendants would
receive the death penalty.13 Justice Douglas noted: "Under these
laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty. People live or
die, dependent on the whim of one man or of twelve."' 4  Justice
Stewart likened the imposition of the death penalty to "being struck
by lightning"15 and concluded that "the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death
under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly
and so freakishly imposed." 6 Justice White noted that "the death
penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most atrocious
crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not."' 7
These original concerns later guided the Court when it considered
newly written state death penalty statutes; it upheld only those
statutes under which the legislature imposed some kind of guidance
to limit the unfettered discretion of the sentencing body in the
imposition of the ultimate punishment.18
12. Id. at 240.
13. See Janet C. Hoeffel, Risking the Eighth Amendment: Arbitrariness, Juries, and
Discretion in Capital Cases, 46 B.C. L. REV. 771, 774-75 (2005); Raymond Paternoster,
Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The Decision To Seek the Death Penalty in South
Carolina, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 754, 755 (1983) ("In sum, Furman held that
where a sentencer is provided with discretion in a matter so important and irrevocable as
the death penalty, that discretion must be structured in some way so as to avoid the
capricious and wanton imposition of capital punishment.").
14. Furman, 408 U.S. at 253 (Douglas, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 310.
17. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and Marshall, while holding
that the death penalty is cruel and unusual under any circumstances, called attention to
the arbitrary nature of the punishment as one of the reasons the penalty could not survive.
Justice Brennan concluded that "the very words 'cruel and unusual punishments' imply
condemnation of the arbitrary infliction of severe punishments," and went on to say that
"[w]hen the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is
legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted
arbitrarily." Id. at 274, 293 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Marshall emphasized the
great degree to which "the burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant,
and the underprivileged members of society," which are impermissible arbitrary criteria
for its imposition. Id. at 365-66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
18. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 164-67 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding
capital sentencing scheme that requires a jury or judge to consider mitigating and
aggravating circumstances and allows for automatic proportionality review by the state's
highest court); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248-50, 259-60 (1976) (upholding capital
2007]
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The implication of Furman and Gregg v. Georgia is that in order
to withstand Eighth Amendment scrutiny, the use of the death
penalty cannot be arbitrary; therefore, it must be guided by strict
standards that provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few
cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not"19
and prevent it from being "so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.""0
However, the Court has never demanded similar limits for
prosecutorial discretion,21 even though it is the prosecutor, and not
the jury, who serves as the true gatekeeper of the death penalty in this
country." The Court's focus on limiting the discretion of the
sentencing body ignores the power of the prosecutor to give a jury
that discretion in the first place and simply shifts the unlimited
discretionary power from the jury to the prosecutor.23  Because the
Court does not demand that the prosecutor's decision follow legally
relevant standards, it leaves the door wide open for extralegal and
irrelevant factors to influence that decision, and ultimately for the
penalty to be arbitrarily imposed.
This Comment argues that because of the vast discretion
afforded to prosecutors at the very beginning of the decisionmaking
process of a capital trial, the death penalty as it exists in most
jurisdictions today does not withstand Eighth Amendment scrutiny.
Some prosecutorial discretion is desirable, indeed necessary, in any
system that imposes a penalty of death, for a prosecutor's discretion
sentencing scheme that requires a jury or judge to weigh aggravating and mitigating
factors and allows for automatic review by the state's highest court); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 269-76 (1976) (upholding capital sentencing scheme that requires the jury to
answer two special questions before it can impose the death penalty).
19. Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
21. See Hugo Adam Bedau, Controversies from Prosecution to Execution, in THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 310, 313 (Hugo Adam
Bedau ed., 1997) ("Although the Supreme Court [has] insisted that capital trial juries be
given some form of statutory guidance in deciding whether to sentence the convicted
defendant to life or to death, the Court has not insisted that comparable guidance be
imposed on prosecutors.").
22. Id. ("Yet the decision whether to seek the death sentence is perhaps the most far-
reaching decision to be made in the whole arena of criminal justice.").
23. See State v. Keodatich, 548 A.2d 939, 952-53 (N.J. 1988) ("While limiting jury
sentencing discretion helps to assure that those sentenced to death are a rational subset of
those actually charged of capital crimes, it does not at all assure that those convicted are a
rational subset of those who could be charged with a death-eligible offense."); William J.
Bowers, The Pervasiveness of Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman
Capital Statutes, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1067, 1070 (1983). In most cases, the
government's decision whether to seek a death penalty in any given case begins and ends
with the prosecuting office. See Paternoster, supra note 13, at 758.
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can tilt toward leniency as easily as it can toward overzealousness. 4
But with few legal standards to limit the prosecutor's discretion to
decide which crimes and defendants, among the many eligible, should
receive the death penalty, a significant probability exists that
extralegal factors could influence this decision, and the use of the
punishment could therefore be rendered arbitrary. A system that
gives virtually unreviewable discretion to the government to charge
(or not to charge) a defendant with the death penalty must impose
some kind of limits on that discretion in order to keep these decisions
within a range that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence will tolerate.
While current proposed systems for change may be unrealistic in light
of long traditions of deference to prosecutors, this Comment suggests
a process to provide an adequate check on prosecutorial power to
seek the death penalty.
Part I of this Comment explores the nature and importance of
prosecutorial discretion in the United States, specifically as it relates
to the death penalty. This Part briefly discusses the history and
rationale behind granting full discretion to the prosecutor, then
analyzes the Supreme Court's stance on the relationship between this
discretion and the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence about
the death penalty. Part II discusses the factors, both legal and
extralegal, that influence death penalty charging decisions, and the
disparities that result when extralegal and irrelevant factors come into
play. Finally, Part III discusses the possibility of using the adversarial
process to solve, or at least begin to address, the problem of
unchecked discretion in death penalty decisionmaking. This Part
argues that most currently proposed systems for limiting prosecutorial
discretion will likely not suffice to bring charging decisions within
Eighth Amendment boundaries. This Comment concludes by
proposing the use of a pretrial hearing regarding the prosecutor's
charging decision to render death penalty decisionmaking more
transparent, more consistent, and less arbitrary.
I. THE HISTORY OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE DEATH
PENALTY
American prosecutors have long enjoyed great deference in their
decisionmaking as a result of a multitude of political, societal, and
economic factors. While a discussion of these factors in their entirety
24. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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is outside the scope of this Comment,2 5 these forces have come
together to produce a troublesome result: prosecutors in the United
States enjoy almost limitless, unreviewable 6 discretion in whom to
charge, what to charge, and with whom to bargain.27 This discretion is
so broad, so unbridled, that former United States Attorney General
and Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson characterized the
phenomenon as follows: "The prosecutor has more control over life,
liberty, and reputation than any other person in America. His
discretion is tremendous."2 The Court has long upheld the validity of
this discretion, saying, "In our system, so long as the prosecutor has
probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in
his discretion. 2 9
In fact, the Court has recognized only two constitutional limits
on a prosecutor's charging decision: a prohibition on vindictive or
25. For excellent discussions of the development of prosecutorial power in the United
States, see Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 728-42 (1996) (tracing the history of the development of power in the
local prosecutor and the factors contributing to the centralization in the prosecutor of
authority in the criminal justice system); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial
Discretion in the United States: The Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an
Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325, 1342 (1993) (discussing the growth of
prosecutorial discretion as a result of a historical national tradition of local control); James
Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1523-37
(1981) (explaining the process by which prosecutors "acquired essentially unreviewable
discretion").
26. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the limited value
of judicial review to curb prosecutorial discretion.
27. See Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1971); E. Michael McCann, Opposing Capital
Punishment: A Prosecutor's Perspective, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 649, 668 (1996); Misner, supra
note 25, at 741; Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor's Perspective: Race of
the Discretionary Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811, 1813 (1998).
28. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
3, 3 (1940) (publication of a speech made by then-Attorney General Jackson at the Second
Annual Conference of United States Attorneys in Washington, D.C., on April 1, 1940).
29. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); see also Vorenberg, supra note
25, at 1540 n.71 ("While the Supreme Court opinions generally contain only dicta or else
decide issues only tangentially related to prosecutorial discretion in the criminal law, they
have generated an almost unbroken line of cases upholding prosecutors' powers to decide
who and how to charge."). In large part, the Court's deference to the decisions of the
prosecutor arises from a concern for separation of powers between the judicial and
executive branches. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (stating the
Court's reluctance "to exercise judicial power over a 'special province' of the Executive"
(quoting Heckler v. Chancy, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985))).
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retaliatory prosecution (on due process grounds) 0 and a prohibition
on selective prosecution (on equal protection grounds).31 However,
these two very narrow constraints, grounded in the Fifth
Amendment, do little or nothing to protect against the introduction
of extralegal factors into the decision of whether or not to charge a
case capitally, which could violate the Eighth Amendment.
Importantly, this Comment does not argue that the arbitrariness
inherent in prosecutorial decisionmaking around the death penalty is
necessarily an invidious form of selective or vindictive prosecution.
The seemingly arbitrary charging decisions may simply result from
the prosecutor's subconscious or conscious consideration of extralegal
factors that should be irrelevant to the decision of whether a certain
crime or defendant is worthy of death. Consideration of these factors
could result in arbitrary application of the death penalty and
therefore violate the Eighth Amendment, as the Court held in
Furman.32 Thus, current constitutional restraints on selective or
vindictive prosecution are of little use in this area.
Prosecutorial discretion has few limits in the death penalty arena.
At each stage of a death penalty prosecution, the prosecutor alone
makes the decisions: whether to charge first degree murder, whether
to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, and whether to
proceed all the way through the guilt-innocence and sentencing
phases of a capital trial.33 Like prosecutorial discretion generally, the
Supreme Court has also upheld the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in the area of the death penalty. When the Court first
reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia,34 it found that the
opportunities for discretionary action at each stage of the capital
process were simply points at which "an actor in the criminal justice
system makes a decision which may remove a defendant from
30. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) ("[Wlhile an individual
certainly may be penalized for violating the law, he just as certainly may not be punished
for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.").
31. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 ("One of these [constitutional] constraints [on
prosecutorial discretion] ... is that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on
,an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.'
(quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962))).
32. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (per curiam).
33. See Bowers, supra note 23, at 1075 ("At this early stage in the process that leads to
the death sentence, the prosecutor exercises almost total discretion over the decision
whether to indict for first degree murder."); Jon Sorensen & Donald H. Wallace,
Prosecutorial Discretion in Seeking Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparity in the Pretrial
Stages of Case Processing in a Midwestern County, 16 JUST. Q. 559, 568 (1999) (discussing
the "three identifiable decisions [made by the prosecutor] during the pretrial stages of
capital case processing").
34. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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consideration as a candidate for the death penalty. '35 The Court
further noted that "[n]othing in any of [its] cases suggests that the
decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the
Constitution."36 Here, the Court failed to recognize the possibility
that the prosecutor's very decisions to grant mercy in one case and
seek the death penalty in another might result in an arbitrary
application of the death penalty, depending on the reasons for those
differing decisions. Justice White's concurrence confirms the Court's
ignorance of this risk. He simply assumed that because the same
aggravating factors that guide juries' sentencing decisions must guide
prosecutors' charging decisions, "defendants will escape the death
penalty through prosecutorial charging decisions only because the
offense is not sufficiently serious; or because the proof is insufficiently
strong."37 Justice White incorrectly assumed that prosecutors would
never be influenced by extralegal factors in making the decision to
seek the death penalty.38
The Court ignored similar possibilities a decade later in
McCleskey v. Kemp,39 an equal protection challenge to the application
of the death penalty, even when faced with daunting empirical
evidence of the significant effect of race on the imposition of the
death penalty in Georgia.' In refusing to entertain McCleskey's
challenge to the prosecutor's discretion whether to seek the death
penalty, the Court stated:
[T]he capacity of prosecutorial discretion to provide
individualized justice is "firmly entrenched in American law."
As we have noted, a prosecutor can decline to charge, offer a
plea bargain, or decline to seek a death sentence in any
particular case. Of course, "the power to be lenient [also] is the
power to discriminate," but a capital punishment system that
did not allow for discretionary acts of leniency "would be
totally alien to our notions of criminal justice."'"
35. Id. at 199.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
38. See infra Part II (discussing the variety of extralegal factors that play a role in the
decision to seek the death penalty).
39. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
40. Id. at 286-87. McCleskey presented the findings of David Baldus's study of the
death penalty in Georgia, which revealed "that prosecutors sought the death penalty in
70% of the cases involving black defendants and white victims; 32% of the cases involving
white defendants and white victims; 15% of the cases involving black defendants and black
victims; and 19% of the cases involving white defendants and black victims." Id. at 287.
41. Id. at 311-12 (citations omitted).
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The Court noted that its longstanding precedent would not require a
prosecutor to "explain his decisions unless the criminal defendant
presents a prima facie case of unconstitutional conduct with respect to
his case.
42
Despite its flaws, some prosecutorial discretion is desirable, even
necessary, in a criminal justice system that strives for fairness. First of
all, it is important that accountability for the enforcement of laws be
centralized to the greatest extent possible in one government official
who answers to the public.43 Since prosecutors are typically elected
officials,' this provides for some measure of public accountability for
prosecutorial decisionmaking.45 Secondly, the prosecutor has an
ethical obligation to seek not just a conviction, but justice, in each
individual case.46 The United States Supreme Court has made clear
that the prosecutor
is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose ... interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done .... He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-
indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows,
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about a just one.47
In order to seek the most just result, discretion allows the prosecutor
to consider all of the circumstances of the crime and the
characteristics of the individual defendant in order to determine
42. Id. at 297 n.18.
43. See Misner, supra note 25, at 718 ("The centralization of authority in the
prosecution is a development necessary for a coordinated and responsive criminal justice
system in which the prosecutor will ultimately be held accountable to the voters for the
successes and failures of the system."); Pizzi, supra note 25, at 1339 ("If someone is to
decide which laws will be aggressively enforced, which laws will be enforced occasionally,
and which laws will never be enforced, it makes sense that the person who has to answer
to the voters will make those determinations.").
44. See Pizzi, supra note 25, at 1338 (noting that ninety-seven percent of state
prosecutors are elected).
45. See id.; see also supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing the
prosecutor's heightened public accountability as a function of his elected status).
46. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-1.2(c) (3d ed.
1993); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003).
47. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (responding to a federal
prosecutor's misconduct in highly improper questioning of witnesses and inflammatory
arguments to the jury).
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whether a capital charge is warranted.48 Such flexibility is indeed
desirable; after all, "criminal cases involve people and their actions,
not fungible mechanical parts."49
However, these benefits of discretion come with concomitant
disadvantages. In the death penalty arena, public accountability,
rather than ensuring that a prosecutor acts fairly and justly, can work
to destroy fairness as prosecutors endeavor to respond to their
constituencies, some of which may be avid supporters of the death
penalty while others oppose it.50 Secondly, the prosecutor's ability to
consider the circumstances of each case and the characteristics of
each defendant means that while one defendant may benefit from the
prosecutor's lenience, another defendant in the same jurisdiction may
not be so lucky, resulting in an arbitrary application of the penalty.51
Furthermore, most states' death penalty statutes are so broad and
could cover such a wide range of homicides that the discretion of the
prosecutor by necessity becomes even more expansive.5.
48. See Abrams, supra note 27, at 2 (discussing prosecutorial discretion generally and
stating that "[t]he major advantage of such discretion is that it ... permits a prosecutor in
dealing with individual cases to consider special facts and circumstances not taken into
account by the applicable rules").
49. See Richard H. Kuh, Plea Bargaining: Guidelines for the Manhattan District
Attorney's Office, 11 CRIM. L. BULL. 48, 49 (1975).
50. See infra Part II.A for additional discussion of the influence of political and public
pressure on the decision to charge the death penalty.
51. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text (discussing three particularly shocking
crimes in which the prosecutor chose not to seek the death penalty); see also Vorenberg,
supra note 25, at 1557 ("Because prosecutors often do not charge the maximum
authorized and do offer leniency to most defendants through plea bargaining, a defendant
is hurt in the most basic sense when treated in an unusually harsh manner.").
Furthermore, Vorenberg argues, allowing the prosecutor to exercise lenience in her
application of the law essentially subverts the legislature's policymaking judgment, which
prevents the legislature from realizing the actual impact of the laws it passes, harsh as they
may be. See id. at 1552. He argues: "If we are truly concerned about compassion, we are
less likely to achieve it through the hidden and unpredictable use of prosecutorial
discretion than through encouraging the legislature to see and respond to the results of
archaic or overly harsh laws." Id.
52. See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The Paradox of
Today's Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.
J. 345, 363 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court tolerates overly broad and vague
aggravating factors, resulting in increasingly arbitrary application of the death penalty).
For example, many state statutes include as an aggravating factor that the murder was
committed for the purpose of pecuniary or financial gain. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(1) (West 1999) ("The murder was intentional and carried out for financial
gain."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(f) (West 2001) ("The capital felony was committed
for pecuniary gain."); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(f) (West 1999) (same); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(6) (2005) (same). While a natural reading of the "pecuniary gain"
aggravator would be that it is meant to address murderers for hire, some prosecutors have
sought the death penalty under the "pecuniary gain" aggravator when the murder
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Thus, while prosecutorial discretion can and often does serve
important functions in the criminal justice system, it can also
undermine the fairness and consistency that society and the United
States Supreme Court demands of the justice system when it proposes
to use the irreversible punishment of death. Despite the potential
inconsistency that may result from a prosecutor's discretion to charge
the death penalty, the Court has been hesitant to limit that discretion
in any meaningful way. The Court fails to appreciate the seemingly
arbitrary outcomes that may result from a prosecutor's conscious or
subconscious consideration of extralegal and irrelevant factors. The
next Part explores these factors, as well as the possible and actual
disparities that result from them.
II. THE IMPACT OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION ON THE DEATH
PENALTY
Because the charging power of the prosecutor is so broadly cast
in most state statutes,53 a prosecutor may weigh a wide variety of
factors in her decision whether to the seek the death penalty.
Some of these factors are legitimate and represent precisely what
legislatures likely intended when drafting death penalty statutes. For
example, the aggravating factors for death-eligible crimes in many
death penalty statutes include whether the crime included multiple
victims.54 Thus, the number of victims of a crime would be a legally
occurred during an ordinary robbery or burglary, arguing that these murders were also
committed for "pecuniary gain." The prosecutor's charging decision in State v. Powell, 340
N.C. 674, 459 S.E.2d 219 (1995), which relied on a typical pecuniary gain statute,
exemplifies this nearly limitless discretion to manipulate aggravating factors. Powell was
unarmed when he entered a convenience store intending to rob it, and stated that when, in
the process of the robbery, the clerk slapped him, "he had panicked, he had not intended
to harm her, and he merely wanted the money from the cash register," at which point the
defendant grabbed a tire iron that was under the counter and struck the clerk with it. Id.
at 682-84. The jury found Powell guilty of first-degree murder solely on felony murder
grounds (with the robbery itself as the underlying felony), found "pecuniary gain" as the
sole aggravating circumstance, and recommended the death penalty. Id. at 685-86. Such a
result exemplifies the prosecutor's limitless ability to manipulate the aggravating factors to
fit a capital charge. See also infra notes 55-56 for a discussion of the overly broad
"heinous, atrocious, and cruel" aggravating factor.
53. See supra note 52.
54. For a sample of state statutes including multiple victims as an aggravating factor,
see, for example, ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(9) (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-703(f)(8) (2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(3) (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-
1.3-1201(5)(g) (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2002); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 21-4625(2) (1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025(2)(a)(6) (LexisNexis 1999);
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303(g)(1)(ix) (LexisNexis 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 200.033(12) (LexisNexis 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095(1)(d) (2005); TEX. PENAL
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relevant factor for a prosecutor to consider when making the decision
whether to pursue the death penalty. Similarly, since most state
death penalty statutes employ some form of aggravating circumstance
that addresses the heinousness of the crime,55 the circumstances
surrounding the offense (whether it involved torture, significant pain
and suffering for the victim prior to death, or other circumstances that
show great cruelty) are appropriate considerations in making the
decision.56 Other legally relevant considerations might include the
strength of the state's case or the quality of its evidence, including the
reliability of witnesses.57
While most would agree that the decision to seek the death
penalty should be based solely on these types of legally relevant
factors,58 the very nature of the broad discretion granted to the
prosecutor makes it almost inevitable that other extralegal, and
arguably irrelevant, factors might influence the decision to pursue the
death penalty.59 In one Florida study, when asked about influential
CODE ANN. § 19.03(7) (Vernon 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31(7) (2004); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.95.020(10) (West 2002).
55. For a sample of state statutes including heinousness or extreme cruelty as an
aggravating factor, see, for example, ALA. CODE § 13A-5-49(8) (LexisNexis 2005); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(f)(6) (2001); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(14) (West 1999);
COLO. REV. STAT. 18-1.3-1201(5)(j) (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a(4) (West
2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(h) (West 2001); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(e)
(2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4625(6) (1995); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.4(7)
(2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101(5)(h) (West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(d)
(1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5(VII)(h) (LexisNexis 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2000(e)(9) (2004); OKL. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12(4) (West 2002); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 39-13-202(i)(5) (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-202(1)(r) (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-
2-102(h)(7) (2005).
56. However, even these statutory aggravating circumstances may vest far too much
discretion in the prosecutor to determine the meaning of "heinous, atrocious, or cruel."
Professor Richard Rosen argues that the "especially heinous" aggravating factor tends to
broaden the discretion of sentencing bodies, rather than limit it, as required by the Eighth
Amendment. See Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance
in Capital Cases-The Standardless Standard, 64 N.C. L. REV. 941, 945 (1986). Rosen
states that "[D]iscrimination, arbitrariness, [and] caprice ... all can be present when the
sentencer is left free to choose to execute or not depending on a subjective evaluation of
the 'badness' or 'heinousness' of the murder." Id. at 992. The same can easily be said
about the prosecutor's discretion as well.
57. See Bowers, supra note 23, at 1076.
58. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Sorensen & James W. Marquart, Prosecutorial and Jury
Decisionmaking in Post-Furman Texas Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
743, 743 (1990-91) (arguing that Supreme Court precedent requires that prosecutorial
discretion in this area be limited by legal relevance).
59. See Stewart F. Hancock, Jr. et al., Race, Unbridled Discretion, and the State
Constitutional Validity of New York's Death Penalty Statute-Two Questions, 59 ALB. L.
REV. 1545, 1563 (1996) ("One inevitable consequence of unlimited prosecutorial
discretion is that the critical decisions whether to charge a defendant with a capital crime
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factors in decisions to indict on first-degree murder and take a case to
trial on first-degree murder, prosecutors, judges, and defense
attorneys "mentioned more extralegal considerations [than] ... 'legal
factors or considerations.' "60
Factors that are legally irrelevant to the government's ability to
prove statutory aggravating factors necessary for the imposition of
the death penalty are, in essence, arbitrary factors, that can and will
vary from prosecutor to prosecutor within a given jurisdiction.61
Thus, if prosecutors base their decisions, even in part, on such legally
irrelevant factors, then a substantial risk exists that the death penalty
is arbitrary, and therefore contravenes the Eighth Amendment.62 The
... will depend on the particular philosophical, ethical, religious or other views of the
individual prosecutor."); McCann, supra note 27, at 668 ("The danger [of discretion is
that] the prosecutor will be guided not by the appropriate legal considerations of a
particular case but rather by extraneous pressures that should not influence the charging
decision as to whether to file for capital punishment."); Paternoster, supra note 13, at 758
("Numerous factors go into this decision, some of which are legally relevant .... Other
factors, however, may enter into this decision, such as the race of the victim or the
offender, or the location within the state where the homicide occurred."); Pokorak, supra
note 27, at 1813-14 ("With this prosecutorial freedom, however, comes the danger that
invidious considerations will prompt these death penalty decision makers.").
60. See Bowers, supra note 23, at 1077. The extralegal factors included, for example,
the personal orientation of a prosecutor, situational pressures and constraints in handling
a case, and social influences and pressures from the community, while the legal factors
included the facts of the case, aggravating and mitigating considerations, strength of the
case, and quality of the evidence. Id. at 1076.
61. The United States Supreme Court has never clearly defined what is arbitrary.
While all of the Justices' opinions in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam),
expressed concern about arbitrariness, most asserted that it existed simply because there
was no way to predict which crimes and defendants would get the death penalty. See
supra note 17 (describing the Justices' positions on the issue). The closest the United
States Supreme Court has come to defining what is "arbitrary" is by giving examples of
what arbitrary factors might be when commenting on the Georgia Supreme Court's death
penalty statute, which requires the Court to review every death sentence to determine
whether it "was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary
factor." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 166-67 (1976) (plurality opinion). Black's Law
Dictionary does not clarify the word any further, defining "arbitrary" as "depending on
individual discretion; specif., determined by a judge rather than by fixed rules, procedures,
or law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 41 (8th ed. 2004).
62. See Michael J. Songer & Isaac Unah, The Effect of Race, Gender, and Location on
Prosecutorial Decisions To Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 58 S.C. L. REV. 161,
205-06 (2006) (discussing how the consideration of legally irrelevant factors such as victim
and defendant characteristics and geographic location has led to the arbitrary imposition
of the death penalty in South Carolina); Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 58, at 750-51
("If prosecutors' ... decisions were not made on the basis of legally relevant factors, it
may be concluded that the death penalty was imposed arbitrarily."); Douglas W. Vick,
Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences,
43 BUFF. L. REV. 329, 338 (1995) ("Any system for selecting offenders to die for their
crimes that is so strongly influenced by a legally irrelevant consideration ... is operating
arbitrarily.").
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remainder of this Part explores some of the extralegal factors that
pose the greatest risk of arbitrariness in the decisionmaking process,
including political and public influences, financial considerations,
characteristics of the victim, and the quality of defense counsel in the
case.
A. Political and Public Influences
The political or public pressure that prosecutors may face from
their superiors, law enforcement, and the public is perhaps one of the
most disturbing extralegal factors that often plays into death penalty
decisions.63 As mentioned earlier, some argue that the prosecutor's
elected status is one of the best controls on their discretion.' One
commentator noted, "As an elected official, the prosecutor in
exercising discretion is perhaps best controlled by the forces of public
opinion. Where an aroused public insists on the enforcement of a
particular statute, a thorough prosecution is likely."65 The National
District Attorney's Association's National Prosecution Standards also
support the local election of the prosecutor, stating: "The key to
election at the local level is public accountability and the need for
autonomy within the local jurisdiction .... This system also works
well to control the individual prosecutors in the exercise of sound
discretion which is vital to the successful management of crime
control."66
Despite the goal of checking discretion through political
accountability, when local communities within a given state vary
widely in their views of the purpose and goals of law enforcement,
such public control over prosecutorial decisionmaking may itself
63. See Bowers, supra note 23, at 1069 ("Prosecutors, who are typically elected, must
be sensitive to community sentiments and reactions to crime, which they will encounter in
the media, among associates; and from the police, families of victims, and prominent
community spokesmen .... To maintain community support and to win reelection,
prosecutors are likely to seek the death penalty when the community wants it, apart from
strictly legal considerations.").
64. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text; see also John A. Horowitz,
Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating a Committee to Decide Whether
To Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2571, 2575 (1997) ("Local prosecutors
must stay in close contact with the people they represent, and prosecute only those crimes
and those criminals which most concern people. The electoral process, therefore, ensures
that a community's standards will be reflected in the criminal justice system." (footnotes
omitted)).
65. Note, Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1075 (1955).
66. NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 13-14
(1991) (standard 3.1 and commentary).
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result in arbitrary application of the legislature's intent.67 For
example, if the majority of the voters in one county within a death
penalty state are staunchly against the death penalty, while voters in
another are strong supporters, such diversity of thought can create a
"struggle between the interests of a local community and those of the
state-at-large" which is "a fundamental problem in the administration
of the death penalty.
6 8
While constituents of a local community may sometimes serve as
an adequate check on potential underenforcement of certain laws by
a prosecutor, the public's hunger for the death penalty, or lack
thereof, constitutes an extralegal factor that has nothing to do with
the circumstances of a particular offense or the offender. Therefore,
this factor should have nothing to do with a prosecutor's decision to
seek the death penalty. When crimes are particularly noteworthy,
public pressure for more severe punishment often increases,69 and
"[s]ince visibility focuses greater scrutiny on the prosecutor, only a
prosecutor whose political position is unusually secure can disappoint
expectations that are part of the climate in which he works."7 But
because "what is seen as outrageous varies with time and place,"71 a
prosecutor's response to this pressure may result in arbitrary
treatment of defendants from community to community. Justice
67. See Pizzi, supra note 25, at 1343-44 ("Partly because of differences in resources,
and partly because of differences in enforcement philosophies and priorities, it will often
be the case that two prosecutorial offices in the same state will treat the possession of a
small amount of cocaine, a first time property offense, or drunk driving differently. This
means that the same criminal laws may be enforced differently within a single state. In
short, a certain disuniformity in the enforcement of the same criminal laws is built into the
political structure in which American prosecutors operate.").
68. See Horowitz, supra note 64, at 2579-80. One could argue that the prosecutor's
accountability to his constituency is no different than a state legislature's response to its
constituency in adopting the death penalty and shaping the standards under which it will
be imposed. These situations may seem facially similar, but a closer examination shows
one very significant difference between these responses that is key to this discussion. A
legislative body usually considers the opinions of a wide variety of interested parties and
engages in significant debate before coming to the most appropriate conclusion regarding
a proposed law. Additionally, legislative history provides further accountability by giving
an account of how the legislature came to its decision. In contrast, a prosecutor need not
consult anyone at all when deciding to seek the death penalty, nor is he required to
publish or make any record of the reasoning behind his decision. While some prosecutors
do consult with others, such consultation is not constitutionally required. Arguably, the
differing standards for the death penalty across states could themselves result in arbitrary
application of the death penalty, but that discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment.
69. See Bowers, supra note 23, at 1075. One state judge in the Florida study explicitly
stated that a " 'high publicity case is more likely to be filed first degree murder,' " the first
step en route to a death penalty charge. Id.
70. Vorenberg, supra note 25, at 1526-27.
71. Id. at 1527.
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William Brennan, a consistent opponent of the death penalty, pointed
out this notable flaw in the death penalty decisionmaking process:
Passions, as we all know, can run to the extreme when the State
tries one accused of a barbaric act against society, or one
accused of a crime that-for whatever reason-inflames the
community. Pressures on the government to "do something,"
can overwhelm even those of good conscience .... When
prosecutors and judges are elected, or when they harbor
political ambitions, such pressures are particularly dangerous.7"
Justice Brennan's suggestion that politically ambitious
prosecutors might use the death penalty as a campaign tool raises
even greater cause for concern when considering the public influence
on the prosecutor's decision. As one commentator noted: "[The
death penalty's] political value is the unstated dark side to
prosecutors' argument that they use the death penalty because their
public demands it. One thing the most fervent district attorneys share
is political ambition." 3 A former prosecutor observed, darkly, that
"the district attorney announcing a capital charge before news
cameras, pressing the case in ... courts where still and TV cameras
are allowed, and then vehemently pressing after conviction for capital
punishment before the jury and the cameras, can emerge as a folk
hero," and that such a possibility might lead an overly ambitious
prosecutor to overcharge a case, or seek the death penalty where
unwarranted.74  The grim possibility that a prosecutor may
overcharge, or more adamantly pursue the death penalty in response
72. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 459 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan argued that death-qualification of a capital trial jury (the main issue in Witt)
would allow such "overzealous" prosecutors to assemble juries who were "predisposed to
convict and certainly predisposed to impose the ultimate sanction." Id. at 459-60.
73. See Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1995, § 6
(Magazine) at 20, reprinted in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 21, at 319,
328.
74. McCann, supra note 27, at 669 (footnotes omitted). Note that these prosecutors
are often only following the lead of elected officials in higher offices in their states who
have run on death penalty platforms. See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role
and Consequences of the Death Penalty in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 711, 720-26 (1990-91) (describing how politicians use the death penalty to
garner votes). Even candidates for the office of President of the United States have
centered campaigns on the death penalty. Id. at 711 (describing how George H.W. Bush
"made the death penalty a central issue in the 1988 presidential race"); see also Alexander
Nguyen, Bill Clinton's Death Penalty Waffle-and Why It's Good News for Execution's
Foes, AM. PROSPECT, July 14, 2000, http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section
=root&name=ViewWeb&articleld=150 (discussing the transformation of former
President Bill Clinton from a death penalty opponent to a supporter and back again,
morphing as necessary to correspond with his important political moments).
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to public expectations, seriously impairs any chance that the death
penalty might be administered fairly and consistently across every
jurisdiction in the country.
In addition to responding to public pressure, prosecutors must
also respond to competing political considerations when dealing with
their superiors and the law enforcement officers in their jurisdictions.
One of the Florida state judges in the aforementioned study
suggested that police pressure can often play a major role in the
decision to file a first-degree murder charge: " '[T]he police will
convince themselves they've got a better case than they do, and the
[prosecutor] assigned to charge the case may not be strong enough to
stand up to a particular police investigator.' "I' Similarly, a former
prosecutor noted the inherent danger when "a young and
inexperienced prosecutor, such as are not infrequently elected in rural
counties, may be induced by well-intentioned but ill-advising senior
law enforcement officials to press a capital punishment charge on
inadequate evidence.
7 6
Furthermore, a prosecutor often faces competing political
pressure between her own constituency, which elected her, and her
superiors, including the state attorney general, the governor, or
others. In one particularly noteworthy case, New York Governor
George Pataki superseded Bronx District Attorney Robert Johnson
in the prosecution of Angel Diaz for the murder of a police officer.77
Pataki, believing that Johnson was philosophically opposed to the
death penalty and would not seek it in any case, appointed the state's
attorney general to try the case instead.78 Pataki's gubernatorial
campaign had included a promise to reinstate the death penalty in
New York,79 and he made good on that promise when New York's
new death penalty statute was enacted on March 7, 1995.80 On that
day, Johnson publicly expressed his concerns about the effectiveness
of the death penalty as a punishment and announced his " 'present
intention not to utilize the death penalty provisions of the statute,' "I'
but never stated categorically that he would not seek the death
penalty, nor was he given a chance to come to a decision about the
75. Bowers, supra note 23, at 1075.
76. McCann, supra note 27, at 670.
77. See Rachel L. Swarns, Governor Removes Bronx Prosecutor from Murder Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 1996, at Al.
78. Id.
79. Rachel L. Swarns, Prosecutor Resists Pataki Pressure on Death Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21,1996, at B1.
80. Id.
81. See Swarns, supra note 77.
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death penalty in the Diaz case.82 Johnson was reelected in the Bronx
by a significant margin only eight months after his public statement
about his intentions regarding New York's new death penalty
statute,83 and while he tried to resist pressure from the governor in
order to carry out those intentions, he ultimately failed.' Indeed,
Johnson himself said that Pataki's supersedure was " 'tantamount to
the disenfranchisement of the voters of the Bronx.' "85
Similarly, Kamala Harris, a newly elected district attorney in San
Francisco, faced a firestorm of controversy and the threat of
supersedure when she announced her decision not to seek the death
penalty against David Hill, who was charged with the murder of a
police officer.86 Harris faced pressure from all sides about the case.87
The Police Officers Association, both United States Senators from
California (notably, Democrats Barbara Boxer and Dianne
Feinstein), forty members of the state legislature, and the state
attorney general all called for Harris to change her decision.88 On the
other side, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a
resolution supporting the decision by a large majority,89 and a public
82. Id. The New York statute gave the prosecutor 120 days from arraignment to file
notice of intent to seek the death penalty, but Pataki said, "It doesn't matter if he had 120
days or 120 years. Unless [he's] willing to look at this objectively, [he] will not apply the
fair standard." Id.
83. Horowitz, supra note 64, at 2582.
84. While some commentators suggested that Pataki's action might not be
constitutionally permissible, see Swarns, supra note 77, the New York Court of Appeals
(that state's highest court) ultimately held that the supersedure was within the governor's
constitutional authority. Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1997). The
defendant committed suicide in his cell before he was ever tried, while Pataki and Johnson
continued to fight their constitutional battle over the supersedure in court. Id. at 1004.
The New York Court of Appeals has since ruled that the state's death penalty is
unconstitutional because of its so-called "deadlock instruction," see N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 400.27(10) (McKinney 2005), to the jury. See People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341,
359 (N.Y. 2004). Under the deadlock instruction, the jury must agree unanimously on
either death or life in prison without parole, and if they fail to agree, the defendant
receives life imprisonment with parole eligibility in as few as twenty years. Id. at 356. The
court found that because the option in case of deadlock was a more lenient choice than
either of the two before the jury, a juror arguing for life might be coerced into agreeing
upon death because she fears the defendant will be back on the streets in twenty years. Id.
at 358.
85. Horowitz, supra note 64, at 2582.
86. See Harriet Chiang, Lockyer Sides with Harris, S.F. CHRON., June 9, 2004, at B3;
Charlie Goodyear, Hundreds March To Demand Death for Officer's Killer, S.F. CHRON.,
May 11, 2004, at B4. California's death penalty statute qualifies the murder of a police
officer as an aggravating circumstance. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(7) (West 1999).
87. Suzanne Herel, Supes Officially Back DA In Cop-Killer Case, S.F. CHRON., May




poll of San Francisco residents revealed that seventy percent
supported the decision as well.9" After suggesting originally that he
might supersede Harris's decision and take over the case,9 1 California
Attorney General Bill Lockyer later announced that after reviewing
the case, he determined that Harris had made the right decision based
on the facts.92 Both of these cases reveal the enormous, and often
competing, public and political pressures brought to bear on district
attorneys and the disparate (and arbitrary) effects that may result-
Harris's decision reflected the first time since 1978 that a California
prosecutor failed to seek the death penalty in the murder of a police
officer.93
While some might argue that the constitutional limits on
discriminatory or vindictive prosecution will act as a constraint on a
politically ambitious prosecutor seeking the death penalty where
unwarranted, a defendant faces a long uphill battle when trying to
prove that the prosecutor acted upon political motivations.94 Thus,
little can operate as a check on a prosecutor's potential political use
of the death penalty.95
90. See Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, D.A.'s Death Penalty No-Go Gets a Thumbs-
Up in S.F. Poll, S.F. CHRON., May 19, 2004, at Bi. Harris had also been very up front
during her campaign about her position opposing the death penalty. See Harriet Chiang,
D.A. Defends Decision Not To Seek Execution, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 25, 2004, at Bi.
91. See Paul Feist & Jaxon Van Derbeken, Lockyer Hints He'll Grab S.F. Cop-Killing
Case, S.F. CHRON., May 8, 2004, at Al.
92. See Chiang, supra note 86.
93. Jaxon Van Derbeken, S.F. Police Push Hard for Death Penalty, S.F. CHRON., Apr.
21, 2004, at Al.
94. McCann, supra note 27, at 668; see also supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text
(describing the United States Supreme Court's posture of deference toward prosecutorial
decisions in general and in the death penalty arena in particular).
95. The American Bar Association standards twice address the issue of political
influence over prosecutorial charging decisions. Most relevant to this discussion, the
standards state, "In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no
weight to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved or
to a desire to enhance his or her record of convictions." ABA COMM. ON CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 71 (3d ed. 1993) (standard 3-3.9 (d)). On a more general plane,
the ABA standards say, "A prosecutor should not permit his or her professional judgment
or obligations to be affected by his or her own political, financial, business, property, or
personal interests." Id. at 7 (standard 3-1.3(f)). However, no clear evidence exists that
these ethical guidelines do much to limit the discretion of the prosecutor. Professor
Kenneth Melilli argues that professional responsibility courses in law schools focus more
on private practitioners, whose role is that of zealous advocate, and less on prosecutors,
whose role is to seek justice. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an
Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 686. This results in prosecutors being "little-
prepared for the responsibility of exercising charging discretion." Id. Nor does Melilli
believe that much, if any, on-the-job ethical training exists. Id. Furthermore, "[h]oles will
exist even in the tightest net of legal and ethical rules-holes that must be filled by the
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B. Financial and Budgetary Considerations
Death penalty prosecutions are extremely costly, in terms of
money, human capital, and opportunity costs-under which a county
may have to forego prosecution of lesser offenses in order to pursue a
capital case. When a local prosecutor bases her decision to seek the
death penalty, even in part, on whether the county can afford it, there
is no question that arbitrary application of the punishment will
result.96  Wealthy counties will pursue the death penalty
proportionally more often than poor counties. 97
The costs involved in a capital case far exceed those of trying
other crimes. Contrary to popular wisdom, the bulk of costs in a
capital case arise at the trial level rather than during the lengthy
appeals process, which means that the local jurisdiction (in most
cases), not the state, bears the brunt of the expense.98 In addition to
the costs of the average criminal trial, the capital trial requires two
separate proceedings to determine guilt and sentencing, which in turn
means more investigation, more expert testimony regarding
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, a significantly longer trial,
and, accordingly, longer detention for the inmate in the county jail. 99
Jury selection tends to be much more extensive, 1°° adding both
financial and opportunity costs due to court time and attorney time
that must be diverted from other cases.01 Some states now require
that indigent capital defendants be appointed two defense attorneys
instead of one,1" and counties may assign additional prosecutors to
attorney's own judgment." Carolyn B. Ramsey, The Discretionary Power of "Public"
Prosecutors in Historical Perspective, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1309, 1318 (2002); see also
Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of
Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 134-37 (2004) (discussing how the intense pressure on
prosecutors to get convictions may interfere with prosecutors' desires to follow their
professional and ethical obligations).
96. See Ashley Rupp, Note, Death Penalty Prosecutorial Charging Decisions and
County Budgetary Restrictions: Is the Death Penalty Arbitrarily Applied Based on County
Funding?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2735, 2768 (2003).
97. Id. at 2769 ("The lack of money and the lasting economic impact of a death
penalty trial on the community can create a real disincentive to pursue a death penalty
conviction while a surplus can make counties more likely to pursue the death penalty.").
98. See Richard C. Dieter, Millions Misspent: What Politicians Don't Say About the
High Cost of the Death Penalty, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA, supra note 21, at
401,405-06.
99. See McCann, supra note 27, at 699; Rupp, supra note 96, at 2754.
100. See Dieter, supra note 98, at 406; Pierce & Radelet, supra note 74, at 719.
101. See Rupp, supra note 96, at 2754.
102. Dieter, supra note 98, at 406.
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capital cases as well, increasing costs even more. 103 Furthermore, if an
appellate court reverses a death sentence for error and remands it to
the trial court for resentencing, the county will bear that cost.
1 °4
These costs add up to a significant strain on county and state
budgets. One study in California showed that that state spent $90
million annually on capital cases above and beyond the cost of an
average murder trials, $78 million of which was spent at the trial (and
thus the local) level.'015 Another study from Los Angeles showed that
capital cases there cost three times as much as noncapital cases."0 6 In
Queens County, New York, capital trials create 300% to 500% more
work than noncapital trials.10 7 In one capital appeal in Brooklyn, the
county had to enlist the help of eight other county prosecutors'
offices. 8 The impact of these costs on a local county's budget can be
devastating.10 9 In some cases, these costs may force a county to make
tradeoffs in other areas, like law enforcement and social benefits.1
Prosecutors cannot simply ignore these realities. When faced with
limited resources, prosecutors must decide which cases, among all the
death-eligible crimes that occur in their jurisdictions, to pursue as
capital."1
The obvious result of this reality is that financial considerations
can and do come into play when a prosecutor is deciding whether to
seek the death penalty. Particularly in smaller, more rural counties,
prosecutors may wisely choose not to commit their county's resources
to a capital trial.' On the other hand, of 944 executions in the
103. See Rupp, supra note 96, at 2754 ("The hidden costs of death penalty trials are the
opportunity costs to prosecutors' offices. If four prosecutors are needed in a capital case
compared to only two in a non-capital murder case, prosecutorial resources are depleted."
(footnote omitted)).
104. See Pierce & Radelet, supra note 74, at 719.
105. See Rupp, supra note 96, at 2755.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2757.
108. Id.
109. See Dieter, supra note 98, at 401; Rupp, supra note 96, at 2759.
110. Rupp, supra note 96, at 2760-61 (noting that the exorbitant cost of capital trials
may force counties to choose between these prosecutions and more basic needs like
additional law enforcement officers, public nursing positions, and public employee raises).
111. See Horowitz, supra note 64, at 2578. Horowitz discusses how the discretion of the
prosecutor in general has broadened as the criminal codes within states have burgeoned,
and notes that this phenomenon forces the prosecutor to make difficult decisions: "With
more conduct being considered criminal and a limited resource pool, prosecutors cannot
enforce every criminal statute." Id. Given the extraordinary resources capital cases
require, it would follow that the problem of limited resources will also limit the
prosecutor's ability to pursue the death penalty in every death-eligible case.
112. See Dieter, supra note 98, at 405 ("While many politicians continue to ignore these
costs in using the death penalty to sound tough, some prosecutors are now deciding not to
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United States between 1977 and 2005, almost one-tenth originated in
Harris County (Houston), Texas, one local jurisdiction."1 3 The
county's ability to prosecute so many homicides as capital cases is due
in large part to the significant resources provided to the district
attorney's office by the county commission. "4
The cost of a capital trial is totally irrelevant to the circumstances
of the crime or the strength of the case against the defendant, and is
therefore an extralegal factor in the prosecutor's decision. It poses a
great danger that a defendant's risk of facing the death penalty
increases or decreases with the size of the local budget. Such a
danger is intolerable under the Eighth Amendment."5
Both the political and financial pressure brought to bear on local
prosecutors in a homicide case can result in widely variant
decisionmaking from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, as evidenced in the
Harris County example above. One Maryland study found that a
defendant's chances of facing a notice to seek the death penalty
depend in large part upon the county in which he is charged."6
seek executions because the cases are simply too expensive."); Hancock et al., supra note
59, at 1563; Nicci Lovre-Laughlin, Lethal Decisions: Examining the Role of Prosecutorial
Discretion in Capital Cases in South Dakota and the Federal Justice System, 50 S.D. L.
REV. 555, 572 (2005).
113. See TEX. DEFENDER SERV., MINIMIZING RISK: A BLUEPRINT FOR DEATH
PENALTY REFORM IN TEXAS 38 (2005). Harris County's murder rates are relatively
similar to that of other urban Texas counties, including Dallas County and Bexar County
(San Antonio), yet Harris County sends almost twice as many murder defendants to death
row than the other two counties combined. Id. at 39. The county's relentless pursuit of
the death penalty in almost every eligible case prompted death penalty abolitionists to
lobby the International Olympic Committee to reject Houston's bid for the 2012 Summer
Games. See Mike Tolson, A Deadly Distinction, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 4,2001, at Al.
114. Tolson, supra note 113; see also Mike Tolson, A Deadly Distinction: County Has
Budget To Prosecute with a Vengeance, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 5, 2001, at A28
(comparing the $292,000 prosecutorial budget of a small Texas county with the $30 million
budget in the Harris County D.A.'s office and discussing the impact of this difference on
the two counties' abilities to pursue capital convictions). Tolson's four-part series uses the
Harris County case study to offer a comprehensive and compelling look at all sides of the
death penalty issue, including arbitrariness, prosecutorial discretion, indigent defense,
innocence, and more. One factor that may have played a role in the success of Harris
County prosecutors in obtaining death sentences is that, until 2005, Texas was one of only
two death penalty states (the other is New Mexico) that did not offer jurors the option of
life without parole. See Jim Vertuno, Perry Signs Life Without Parole Bill, HOUSTON
CHRON., June 17, 2005, at B1. But this does not explain the disparity between Harris
County and every other county in Texas.
115. See Rupp, supra note 96, at 2770-73. Rupp argues that because budgetary
considerations are not a legal factor upon which meaningful distinctions can be drawn
among death-eligible cases, Eighth Amendment arbitrariness analysis should be applied at
the pretrial stage to the prosecutor's charging decision. Id. at 2775-77.
116. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER & ROBERT BRAME, AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
MARYLAND'S DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLUENCE OF
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Studies across the nation reveal significant differences in death
penalty charging decisions between urban and rural areas, and even
more significantly, the studies vary in whether prosecutors in urban
areas or rural areas are more likely to seek the death penalty than
their counterparts. 1 7  In some counties, the prosecutor seeks the
death penalty as often as she is allowed,"8 while in others, the
prosecutor rarely, if ever, seeks the death penalty."9  These
differences, if based even in minute part on extralegal factors like
cost, constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, and therefore
should not be tolerated.
RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION 23-25 (2003), available at http://www.news
desk.umd.edu/pdf/exec.pdf (Executive Summary). For example, these researchers found
that, controlling for variables in the crimes themselves, a prosecutor in Baltimore County
was thirteen times more likely to file notice to seek the death penalty than in Baltimore
City. Id. at 25.
117. For example, a South Carolina study showed that the "prosecutor's decision to
request a death sentence is significantly more likely in rural than urban areas .... [T]his is
true even though a slightly greater proportion of homicides are capital murders in urban
... than in rural areas .... " See Paternoster, supra note 13, at 780. Similarly, in
Nebraska, prosecutors in the major urban counties were more than twice as likely to
pursue a capital charge all the way through to sentencing than elsewhere in the state. See
David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death
Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973-1999), 81
NEB. L. REV. 486, 626 fig.30 (2002). But a study of Virginia's death penalty showed that
prosecutors were more likely to seek the death penalty in "low-density, typically rural
localities" (85% of death-eligible cases) and "medium-density, mostly suburban
jurisdictions" (85%) than in "high-density, mostly urban areas" (16%). See JOINT
LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMM'N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF
VIRGINIA'S SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 46-47 (2001) [hereinafter JLARC
REPORT], available at http://jlarc.state.va.us/Meetings/DecemberOl/capital.pdf.
118. For example, Johnny Holmes, the district attorney for Harris County, Texas, from
1981 to 2000, sought the death penalty in every death-eligible case. See TEX. DEFENDER
SERV., supra note 113, at 38. Holmes told the Houston Chronicle, "If there are rules, they
ought to be enforced .... If the death penalty substantively fits a given crime and I have
enough stuff so that a jury will give it, tell me why I shouldn't prosecute it. It promotes
disrespect for the law if you don't enforce it." Tolson, supra note 113. Similarly, in 1995,
"Philadelphia County's death-row population of 105 [was] the third largest of any county's
in the nation, close behind Houston's Harris County and Los Angeles County--counties
far more populous and murderous than Philadelphia" because the Philadelphia District
Attorney seeks the death penalty "virtually as often as the law will allow." Rosenberg,
supra note 73, at 320.
119. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (discussing the reluctance of Bronx
D.A. Robert Johnson to seek the death penalty in any case and the resulting intervention
by Governor George Pataki); Rosenberg, supra note 73, at 322 ("Pittsburgh's District
Attorney ... is as sparing in the application of the death penalty as Philadelphia's is
ardent.").
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C. Identity of the Victim
Few death penalty proponents would openly argue that the lives
of some victims count more than others. However, when examining
prosecutors' decisions, this indeed seems to be the case. The identity
of the victim can play a significant role in whether a prosecutor
decides to pursue the death penalty in a particular case. This is
particularly true if the victim is not a sympathetic character.1 0 For
example, a jury may be less able to identify and empathize with
victims who are alcoholics or drug addicts, or who fail to conform to
social norms."' Conversely, when the victim is particularly
sympathetic, a prosecutor may be more likely to seek the death
penalty, even though the crime itself may be identical to one
perpetrated on a less sympathetic victim. Prosecutors surveyed by
one study of Virginia's capital punishment system said that
"defendants who are charged with a capital-eligible murder involving
victims with whom juries are likely to sympathize will usually be
indicted for capital murder." '122 The authors of that study went on to
conclude that this reasoning by the prosecutors may explain Virginia
prosecutors' decisions to charge the death penalty more frequently in
female-victim cases (when the victim is a female, the state seeks the
death penalty in 91% percent of death-eligible cases) than in male-
victim cases (when the victim is male, the State seeks the death
120. Vorenberg, supra note 25, at 1527 ("[I1f the victim excites little sympathy,
prosecutors occasionally may choose a charge below the maximum ....").
121. See Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Empathy: The Problem of Worthy and
Unworthy Victims, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 343, 354 (2003). Sundby describes the results of
the Capital Jury Project, a study used to determine what factors influence juries' decisions
between life and death in capital cases. Id. at 343-44. The study found that capital jurors,
when asked in the abstract, tended to feel that a victim's characteristics would not
influence their decisions between life and death. Id. at 346-48. Yet when the study
inquired about actual deliberations in the jury room, jurors revealed that the
characteristics of the victim indeed played a significant role in their decisions. Id. at 350-
51. The study ultimately found that jurors tended to impose death more often in the
"randomly chosen victim" cases "because jurors are most likely to empathize with a victim
who is engaged in everyday activities." Id. at 375. On the other hand, jurors were less
likely to identify or sympathize with a victim who was "engaged in high-risk or antisocial
behavior leading up to the crime" and were therefore less likely to impose the death
penalty. Id. For example, jurors made statements like "She was a hippie sort of person, a
bit of a gypsy. I've known people like that. I didn't approve of her actions, because she
put herself in danger. She was very unwise." Id. at 365. Other jurors, when discussing a
victim who was a promiscuous gay male, said the victim "disgusted" them, or "the
lifestyle-is somewhat disturbing, I guess." Id. While these statements reflect the views of
the jury, and not of the prosecutor, prosecutors are certainly aware of these attitudes and
doubtless take them into consideration when determining the likelihood of obtaining a
death sentence.
122. See JLARC REPORT, supra note 117, at 52.
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penalty only 63% of the time). 123  A victim might also be more
sympathetic if he or she comes from a wealthy or prominent family.
124
Unfortunately, statistically speaking, the victim's race seems to
be a factor in the prosecutor's decision as well.12 5 The United States
General Accounting Office conducted a review of twenty-eight other
studies of the death penalty, and found that in eighty-two percent of
the studies, the race of the victim was found to influence both the
decision to charge a case capitally, and the actual death sentences
meted out. 126 While these results include both the charging decision
and actual death sentences, the review found the race of the victim to
be more influential at the early stages of the process where a
prosecutor decides whether to pursue the death penalty and whether
to take the case to trial.127 A recent study out of Maryland came to a
similar conclusion: controlling for other variables, prosecutors were
significantly more likely to treat a case capitally in the early stages of
a murder case when the victim was white than when the victim was
black. 128 The Maryland study found that black defendants who kill
white victims were more likely than any other racial combination of
123. Id.
124. Stephen B. Bright, Capital Cases: Challenging Racial Discrimination in Capital
Cases, CHAMPION, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 19, 20. Bright says that among other things,
the need to avenge the murder because of the prominence of the victim in the
community [and] the social and political clout of the family in the community...
are usually far more important to the district attorney in deciding whether to seek
death than the criteria set out in the state's death penalty statute.
Id. A study of Nebraska's death penalty found that a prosecutor's decision to seek the
death penalty was based, in part, on the victim's socioeconomic status. See Baldus et al.,
supra note 117, at 613 fig.25 (showing that the prosecutor was more likely to seek the
death penalty for victims with high socioeconomic status than other victims). Baldus
further notes that some of the discrepancy based on socioeconomic status may be due in
part to evidence that prosecutors may tend to be more deferential to families of wealthier
victims. Id. at 619. Baldus quotes the opinion of one Nebraska attorney who said, " 'A
lower [socioeconomic status] victim's family might get a single shot on the 10 o'clock news,
but that would be it. The VP of an advertising firm will have rallies, posters, letters to the
editor, etc.' " Id. at 619 n.279.
125. See Paternoster, supra note 13, at 761 (describing the results of studies in several
different states that show that the victim's race, or the combination of the defendant's race
and the victim's race, have an impact on the decision to indict for capital murder);
Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 58, at 751-52 (descibing the same findings).
126. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES A PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 5 (1990).
127. Id. The review of the studies found the race of the victim to be an influential
factor even after controlling for legally relevant factors such as aggravating circumstances,
id. at 6, and regardless of the quality of the study or methodology used by the researchers,
id. at5.
128. See PATERNOSTER & BRAME, supra note 116, at 29.
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offenders and victims to be charged with a capital crime if the offense
was death-eligible.'29 One study in South Carolina found that "the
victim's race is the most important predictor of the prosecutor's
decision" to seek the death penalty and that the murder of a white
victim was most likely to provoke a death penalty request by the
prosecutor.130 While this consideration may not be a conscious one, it
seems to be a real one. As one commentator noted: "Murderers of
white victims are seen as more deserving of capital punishment than
murderers of black victims," and therefore the prosecutor may feel
more likely to convict and get a death sentence for the killer of a
white victim.'
Characteristics of the victim of a homicide represent extralegal
factors that should have no weight in the decision whether or not to
seek the death penalty, unless the state's death penalty statute
specifies the identity of the victim as an aggravating factor, e.g., that
the victim is a member of some class to which the legislature wants to
afford special protection.132 But the characteristics of the victim
discussed above, including race, class, gender, and background,
involve none of these types of statutorily imposed aggravating factors.
As such, these characteristics should be irrelevant to a death penalty
129. Id. at 29-30.
130. Paternoster, supra note 13, at 784.
131. See Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 58, at 756. Bryan Stevenson, Director of the
Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama, addresses this disparity in the starkest of terms:
We are still living at a time when crimes committed against people of color are
devalued, are seen as not so important, whereas crimes committed against people
who have status, people who are white, are considered all-important. If you add
into that all-important crime the element of race, that is, a minority defendant and
a white victim, you have what for many prosecutors is an all-too-tempting
opportunity to make a reputation, to make a name, to stake a claim on protecting
and responding to the problems of violence that we are all so concerned about.
Remarks of Bryan Stevenson, Carter Center Symposium on the Death Penalty-July 24,
1997, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 329, 372 (1998). Note that this disparity is even more
prominent in actual death sentences meted out by juries. In his remarks, Professor
Stevenson went on to note that in his home state of Alabama, in 1996, less than 5% of
murders there involved a black-on-white killing, and that although 67% of murder victims
in the state are black, 84% of the death sentences there involved murders of white victims,
and 75% of the inmates on death row are black. Id.
132. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-40(a)(5) (LexisNexis 2005) (victim was an on-duty police
officer); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a)(9) (West 1999) (victim was an on-duty firefighter);
COLO. REV. STAT. 18-1.3-1201(5)(c)(III) (2005) (victim was a judge); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4209(e)(1)(p) (2001) (victim was pregnant); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(5)(1)
(West 2006) (victim was under twelve years of age); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-
1(b)(20) (West 2002) (victim was a teacher on school grounds); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
13-204(i)(14) (2003) (victim was elderly or disabled).
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decision, and their consideration poses yet another danger of
arbitrary application of the death penalty. '33
D. Quality of Defense Counsel
Another disturbing extralegal factor that prosecutors may
consider when deciding whether or not to seek a death sentence is the
identity of the defendant's counsel.' One study in Florida found that
first-degree murder indictments (the first step in a death penalty
prosecution) occurred much more frequently for defendants with
court-appointed attorneys than those with private counsel.135 The
authors of the study suggest that court-appointed attorneys are "less
effective in averting a first degree murder indictment than are other
types of attorneys." '136 This statement indicates that it may simply be
the defense attorney's incompetence that leads to the charge, rather
than any conscious decision by the prosecutor to try to railroad an
inept attorney. However, the qualitative data from the study support
a conclusion that prosecutors take into account the skill of the
opposing attorney when deciding how to charge a murder case.
133. To push this conclusion even further, the Virginia ACLU notes that "the
character of a victim is generally irrelevant and inadmissible in criminal cases, except in
cases of self-defense." RACHEL KING, ACLU OF VA., BROKEN JUSTICE: THE DEATH
PENALTY IN VIRGINIA 15 (2003), available at http://www.acluva.org/publications/
vadeathpenalty2003.pdf. On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court has held
that the introduction of victim-impact evidence at sentencing does not violate a
defendant's constitutional rights, see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991),
meaning that if the prosecutor uses such evidence, he may be more likely to secure a death
sentence from a jury if the testimony makes the victim out to be more sympathetic, or if
the jury can otherwise identify with the victim. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying
text. However, this factor only helps the prosecutor determine whether he is likely to
succeed before a jury; it does nothing to inform him in his process of deciding, based on
the legally relevant factors laid out in his state's death penalty statute, whether an
appropriate case is actually death-worthy.
134. For a thorough discussion of the harsh consequences of inadequate defense
counsel for the indigent on death penalty sentencing in general (as opposed to a specific
impact on the prosecutor's decision to charge the death penalty), see generally Stephen B.
Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the
Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994).
135. See Bowers, supra note 23, at 1075. For the purposes of this discussion, the term
"court-appointed attorneys" refers to private attorneys chosen from a list by the court to
represent an indigent defendant, as opposed to an attorney from a county- or state-funded
public defender office. This distinction is a critical one, in that court-appointed private
attorneys may have little to no experience with capital trials. See Bright, supra note 134, at
1843-44. Public defender offices, on the other hand, deal with criminal matters routinely,
and several states have even created offices specifically targeting capital trials for the
indigent. See 150 CONG. REC. Sll, 613 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2004) (statement of Sen. Leahy
discussing the creation of statewide capital defender offices in North Carolina and New
York).
136. Bowers, supra note 23, at 1075.
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When asked what factors influence the decision to take a case to trial
on first degree murder, one judge in the study responded: "Facts of
the case plus how well the attorneys ... work[] together. You pay
more attention to a good attorney than one you know is a lightweight
.... ,"137 Similarly, a Georgia study found that prosecutors are more
likely to ask for the death penalty when the defendant's counsel is
court-appointed, which "suggests that prosecutors make an initial
judgment that they are more likely to be successful in getting a death
sentence after a guilty verdict when opposing counsel is appointed." '138
The quality of a defendant's representation is not the only factor
involving opposing counsel that prosecutors may consider when
making a capital charging decision. The level of resources, funding,
and time available to court-appointed attorneys or public defenders
to spend on capital cases may also affect their ability to adequately
represent capital defendants, and therefore may factor into
prosecutors' decisions whether to seek the death penalty. For
example, after Indiana passed a law requiring that court-appointed
attorneys receive seventy dollars an hour and money for experts,
prosecutors sought the death penalty only half as often as they had
previously. 3 9
As Professor Bowers noted: "The type of attorney is not a
legally relevant consideration that should influence the outcome of
any case, certainly not that of a capital case.""14 Therefore, the use.of
such a factor poses a risk of arbitrary imposition of death sentences
across jurisdictions.
In conclusion, the fact that extralegal factors play a role in the
prosecutor's death penalty decision does not, in and of itself, render
the imposition of the death penalty a per se violation of the Eighth
Amendment. While the evidence is certainly troublesome, it does not
necessarily rise to a risk of constitutional dimensions. However, in
order for the consideration of extralegal factors to be constitutionally
harmless, the resulting capital charges would have to be consistent
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction based on legally relevant factors. In
that case, one would expect to see only a small number of death-
eligible crimes with very similar types of aggravating factors charged
capitally, meaning that even though some extralegal factors may have
137. Id. at 1075-76.
138. James C. Beck & Robert Shumsky, A Comparison of Retained and Appointed
Counsel in Cases of Capital Murder, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 525, 536 (1997).
139. See Rosenberg, supra note 73, at 331. The head of the Indiana Public Defender
Council stated that the new law had "swayed prosecutors not to ask for death." Id.
140. Bowers, supra note 23, at 1078.
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come into play, such factors did not create inherent arbitrariness.
However, as the examples above demonstrate, there is considerable
evidence that shows these factors do in fact create great disparities
between the cases where prosecutors seek the death penalty and
those where they do not. Such results are so arbitrary that "there is
no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the
death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not," '141
rendering the prosecutor's unfettered discretion impermissible under
the Eighth Amendment.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS: LEGITIMATE CONTROLS FOR
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
As evidenced by the discussion in Parts I and II, prosecutorial
discretion has long been, and continues to be, of great concern to the
entire field of criminal justice. However, as this Part will discuss, no
current or proposed system has yet succeeded in finding a way to
strike a balance between the need for discretion in capital cases and
the need for restraint of discretion so as to keep a prosecutor's
decisions within a tolerable range under the Eighth Amendment.
This Part suggests entitling capital defendants to use the adversarial
process to force prosecutors to justify their charging decisions and,
therefore, to conform to Eighth Amendment requirements by
considering only legally relevant factors when deciding to seek the
death penalty.
A. Current and Proposed Solutions Remain Inadequate
One of the most commonly proposed (and sometimes used)
restraints on prosecutorial discretion in the death penalty arena is
internal or informal guidelines to steer the prosecutor's decisions
when a death-eligible homicide prosecution arises. The National
District Attorneys Association calls upon district attorneys to
establish guidelines under which charging decisions may be made.
142
Such guidelines would offer some advantages. They might help
achieve greater consistency in death penalty charging decisions across
death-eligible cases. 143 In one of a handful of judicial decisions in the
141. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
142. See NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS'N, supra note 66, at 132 (commentary to
standards 43.1-43.6). The standard refers to charging decisions in general, but would
logically encompass death penalty decisions.
143. See Abrams, supra note 27, at 57 ("[A]dequately formulated policy can, at the
very least, narrow the range of considerations deemed relevant and channel the thinking
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country to find that prosecutorial discretion in charging the death
penalty might raise a concern about arbitrary application, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, while upholding the prosecutor's discretion as
constitutional, still suggested that there was a "need to promote
uniformity in the administration of the death penalty[,]" and
therefore "strongly recommend[ed] that the Attorney General, and
the various County Prosecutors, in consultation with the Public
Defender, adopt guidelines for use throughout the state by
prosecutors in determining the selection of capital cases.""' Without
such guidelines, prosecutors may be left to rely on their memory or
on a record devoid of any detail from past prosecutors to examine
what has been done before.145 Furthermore, prosecutorial guidelines,
if published, would allow a prosecutor's constituency to hold her
accountable for her decisions in any given case.146
However, internal policies as restraints on prosecutorial
discretion are not very effective in curbing arbitrariness. Guidelines
of this type that have been developed in the past to control
prosecutorial discretion generally tended to be "so broad as to be of
little predictive value. ' 147  Indeed, after the New Jersey Supreme
Court directed the Attorney General's office to develop statewide
guidelines, 148 all New Jersey county prosecutors' offices adopted the
guidelines,149 but several critics suggested that the guidelines were too
general and vague to be of any use. 5' Also, prosecutors are generally
of all prosecutors working within the same prosecutorial system toward the same
elements.").
144. State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 955 (N.J. 1988).
145. See Abrams, supra note 27, at 6 ("[E]ven the single prosecutor may forget what he
has done in the past; his ideas, values, and attitudes may change, or he may not recognize
discrepancies between two decisions separated in time because he has failed adequately to
think through or articulate his grounds for decision." (footnote omitted)).
146. Id. at 26; see also Misner, supra note 25, at 767-70 (discussing prosecutorial
discretion generally and arguing that a prosecutor's failure to follow his own guidelines
would be a "political issue for the electorate").
147. Misner, supra note 25, at 744.
148. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
149. See Joseph R. McCarthy, Note, Implications of County Variance in New Jersey
Capital Murder Cases: Arbitrary Decisionmaking by County Prosecutors, 19 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTS. 969, 988 (2003).
150. See id. The guidelines do little more than suggest that the prosecutor follow the
New Jersey statute regarding aggravating circumstances, and that each county establish a
committee to help the prosecutor review cases. Id. at 988-89. In a subsequent capital
case, a defendant challenged the prosecutor's withdrawal of a plea bargain as a violation
of the guidelines, but the trial court declined to intervene. State v. Jackson, 607 A.2d 974,
975 (N.J. 1992) (Handler, J., dissenting). The New Jersey Supreme Court denied him
leave to appeal the decision, but stayed the defendant's trial, ordering the prosecutor to
determine de novo, in accordance with the adopted guidelines, whether to seek the death
[Vol. 85960
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reluctant to adopt, publish, or follow such guidelines as a matter of
course, 51 nor do the public or the courts expect them to given the
long tradition of deference to prosecutorial discretion discussed
throughout this Comment. Thus, internal guidelines and policies in
general fail to serve the purpose of restraining the prosecutor's
discretion to any meaningful degree.
Some propose the establishment of centralized reviewing
committees, which would evaluate death penalty charging decisions
by local prosecutors. For example, in Illinois, the State's Commission
on Capital Punishment recommended in 2002 that the State establish
a statewide committee that would function to review death penalty
charging decisions by local prosecutors. 152  Another author suggests
the creation of committees in each prosecutorial jurisdiction to
penalty, and to put his reasons for the decision on the record. Id. at 974 (mem.).
Dissenting Judge Handler criticized the majority for simply accepting the guidelines as a
valid means to control the prosecutor's discretion, and went on to state that the
"substantive standards of the guidelines are vague and unfocused in that they fail to
specify the kind of evidence that is genuinely appropriate to determine death eligibility
and death worthiness as a constituent part of the prosecutorial charging function." Id. at
978. Handler said that "the guidelines leave totally unsupervised the exercise of discretion
by prosecutors in determining whether defendants should or should not be tried for capital
murder." Id. In essence, Handler argued that the guidelines failed to direct in any way
how New Jersey prosecutors made capital charging decisions.
151. See Abrams, supra note 27, at 25; Misner, supra note 25, at 744. Professor
Vorenberg attributes this reluctance to the natural human desire for power:
In the end, however, such limits are likely to be no stronger than the
determination of the men and women who abide by them to limit their own
discretion. Human nature being what it is, people rarely give up power
voluntarily, and thus the capacity of self-regulation to remove prosecutorial abuse
and arbitrariness from the criminal justice system is limited.
Vorenberg, supra note 25, at 1545. Pizzi argues that prosecutors may also fear publishing
policies of any kind because "any policy that might be seen as 'soft' on crime can raise a
political issue that might put the prosecutor on the defensive," so a prosecutor might favor
an informal policy that everyone in his office knows, but to which the public lacks access.
Pizzi, supra note 25, at 1365.
152. See STATE OF ILLINOIS, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 84, Recommendation 30 (2002), available at http://www.idoc.
state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission report/complete-report.pdf. Note that Governor
George Ryan ordered this study shortly after declaring a moratorium on the State's death
penalty in 2000. Id. at i (Preamble). The proposed statewide review committee would be
composed of the attorney general, a retired judge appointed by governor, and three state's
attorneys. Id. at 84. The committee would review death penalty charging decisions after
hearing evidence from both the prosecution and the defense. Id. at 85. The state
legislature did implement sweeping death penalty reform legislation in 2003, but declined
to create a statewide review panel as suggested by the Commission. See Edwin Colfax,
Executive Dir., Ill. Death Penalty Educ. Project, Summary of the November 19, 2003 Veto
Override by the Illinois Legislature, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid
=6&did=784 (last visited Feb. 10, 2007).
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actually make the decision whether to seek the death penalty (as
opposed to just reviewing a decision the prosecutor has already
made) in each case where the prosecutor has decided to indict on first
degree murder.'53 However, any committee which involves political
appointees will be subject to the same political pressures discussed
earlier in Part II.A. Furthermore, allowing both sides to present
evidence before these committees would almost approximate an
entire trial, or at least a sentencing hearing, and would therefore be
an inefficient approach when the parties will have to present all the
same evidence at a later trial.'54
Finally, judicial review of prosecutors' charging decisions could
be used as a possible restraint on prosecutorial discretion in death
penalty cases. The long history in this nation of deference to the
discretionary choices of the prosecutor 55 makes this a difficult
proposition. The nation's constitutional tradition of separation of
powers makes the judiciary very reluctant to exercise any kind of
153. See Horowitz, supra note 64, at 2601. Horowitz's proposed committees would be
comprised of seven appointed members, with appointments shared by the governor, the
district attorney, and the committee itself, and both the prosecution and defense would get
to present the results of their investigations. Id. at 2600-01.
154. The federal government has used a centralized review system for capital cases
since the late 1980s. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY
SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, ANALYSIS AND REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL
CASE REVIEW (2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm
[hereinafter FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM] (click on "Part I: Legal Rules and
Administrative Procedures"). No United States Attorney may seek the death penalty in
any case without the authorization of the United States Attorney General. See id. (click
on "Part I.B: The Capital Case Review Procedure"). When a federal prosecutor charges
a defendant with a capital offense, she must submit a "death penalty evaluation form,"
regardless of whether she intends to seek the death penalty. Id. The prosecutor submits
along with the form all materials related to the case, including indictments, a "detailed
prosecution memorandum," and materials submitted by the defendant's counsel. Id. The
case is reviewed by the Capital Case Unit of DOJ's Criminal Division, then by the
Attorney General's capital case review committee. Id. The latter committee forwards its
recommendation to the Attorney General, who makes the "final decision" about whether
the federal government will seek the death penalty in a capital case. Id. Thus, even
though a review process exists in name, the ultimate decision still vests total discretion in
the United States Attorney General. Even if the U.S. Attorney in the particular case
recommends against the death penalty, the Attorney General "retain[s] legal authority as
head of the Justice Department to determine in an exceptional case that the death penalty
is an appropriate punishment...." Id. (click on "Part IV.B: Simplification of Decisions
Against Seeking the Death Penalty"). Furthermore, the U.S. Attorney still retains the
discretion to "refrain[] from a capital charge and review procedure submission in the first
place" or to "reach[] a non-capital plea agreement with the defendant" regardless of the
Attorney General's ultimate decision. Id. (click on "Part III.B: Subsequent Decisional
Stages").
155. See FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM, supra note 154 (click on "Part I: Legal
Rules and Administrative Procedures").
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control over the executive branch's designated role of prosecuting
crime. 56 There are also practical difficulties involved in allowing a
judge the power to consider de novo whether a prosecutor's charge
fits the evidence: if the judge sees a particular piece of evidence that
she feels would or should affect the prosecutor's decision, to raise it
sua sponte would undermine the adversarial tradition.'57
But the real difficulty of using judicial review to control
prosecutorial discretion is the lack of any kind of standard by which
such review might be done.'58 As the United States Supreme Court
recognized in Wayte v. United States:59
In our criminal justice system, the Government retains "broad
discretion" as to whom to prosecute .... This broad discretion
rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is
particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the
strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value,
the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's
relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are
not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are
competent to undertake. 6 °
However, this Comment argues that the mere absence of currently
existing standards for such review does not mean that such standards
could not be developed. Such standards, properly developed and
used, can assist judges to determine, through an adversarial process,
whether a prosecutor's decision in a particular case comports with
consideration of legally relevant factors and with the prosecutor's
past use of the death penalty to effect the "[g]overnment's
enforcement priorities" and "overall enforcement plan."'' The
development of such a system would be difficult, but not impossible.
156. See Horowitz, supra note 64, at 2595; Pizzi, supra note 25, at 1353-54 ("To ask that
an American judge play a[n] ... aggressive role with respect to charging decisions raises
serious separation of powers problems and runs contrary to the adversary tradition in
which judges are assigned a neutral and passive role with respect to charging decisions and
the development of evidence at trial.").
157. See Pizzi, supra note 25, at 1354. Note that Pizzi's argument here discusses
prosecutorial discretion in its broadest sense, encompassing the entire range of crimes
over which the prosecutor has discretion to charge. Thus, the difficulties inherent in a
judicial review model in such a system far exceed those likely to arise in the process
proposed by this Comment. See infra Part II.B.
158. Vorenberg, supra note 25, at 1539 ("More important than the absence of any
opportunity for an early challenge to any abuse of discretion is the lack of any judicially
recognized basis for any such challenge.").
159. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
160. Id. at 607.
161. See infra Part III.B.
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Furthermore, although the Court in Wayte went on to say that
the use of judicial review would exact serious costs from the efficiency
and effectiveness of both law enforcement and the judicial system,162
such an argument is unavailing in the death penalty arena for two
reasons. First, the issue in Wayte was selective prosecution of
individuals who failed to register for the draft,163 and that case
therefore involved prosecutorial discretion in general to deal with all
kinds of criminal statutes and criminal behavior. Judicial review in
the system proposed in the next Section would limit a judge's review
only to the handful of cases in which a prosecutor chooses to seek the
death penalty. As such, the proposed system would only lengthen
proceedings in capital cases, therefore limiting the impact on the
efficiency of the courts. Such a system could actually result in greater
efficiency if decisions made on the front end removed the state from
the much longer proceedings involved with a capital trial.
Furthermore, the defendant's constitutional rights to be free from
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty outweigh the government's
interest in efficient and effective law enforcement, especially in light
of the United States Supreme Court's consistent position that "death
is different. '' "M Therefore, the government's decisions in the death
penalty arena should be subjected to greater scrutiny at every step of
the way.
B. Safeguards to Both Preserve and Check Prosecutorial Discretion
Reforming the system of prosecutorial discretion in death
penalty decisions certainly poses a great deal of challenges, most
prominently the long tradition of deference to prosecutorial
discretion.1 65 However, the nature of the adversarial process provides
162. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08 ("Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails
systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the
criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's
motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial
effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All these are substantial
concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to
prosecute.").
163. Id. at 601-02.
164. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)
("Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two.... [T]here is a corresponding difference in the
need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a
specific case."). As noted previously, the Court has upheld prosecutorial discretion to
seek the death penalty. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
165. See Misner, supra note 25, at 763 ("One cannot simply ignore history, tradition
and practical politics when suggesting change"); id. at 765-66 ("The preeminent role of the
prosecutor in the criminal justice system is unlikely to change. The history of the office of
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a method by which the judicial system in every jurisdiction can act as
an appropriate check on the unfettered discretion of the prosecutor,
without endangering that discretion or its inherent value to the
judicial system at large. One author has argued that the Supreme
Court's arbitrariness analysis should extend beyond the sentencing
phase of a death penalty trial and into pretrial stages of the process.
However, the author failed to propose a methodology for conducting
this analysis, whether it should occur as de novo review at the
appellate level or otherwise.166 This Section argues that defendants
should be entitled to use the adversarial process to attempt to prove
arbitrariness in a prosecutor's death penalty charging decisions.
In his concurrence in Gregg v. Georgia,'67 Justice White noted
that the meie existence of prosecutorial discretion in death penalty
decisions was not enough by itself to pose a constitutional risk of
arbitrariness:
Petitioner simply asserts that since prosecutors have the power
not to charge capital felonies they will exercise that power in a
standardless fashion. This is untenable. Absent facts to the
contrary, it cannot be assumed that prosecutors will be
motivated in their charging decision by factors other than the
strength of their case and the likelihood that a jury would
impose the death penalty if it convicts.168
Justice White went on to suggest that prosecutors would consider
only those same factors that guide the jury at sentencing, that is,
aggravating and mitigating circumstances proven during the
proceedings.169 Regrettably, as this Comment illustrates, prosecutors
often rely on factors totally unrelated to the factors that juries are
instructed to consider at the sentencing phase of a capital trial. If
"facts to the contrary" are available, defendants should be entitled to
bring them before the court.
Similarly, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 7 ' the Court held that statistical
evidence which indicated a disparate impact on black defendants in
Georgia, in and of itself, was not enough to support a claim of
prosecutors, the constitutional direction of the United States Supreme Court ... and the
elected nature of the office of prosecutor all point to a continued expansive role for the
prosecutor."); Pizzi, supra note 25, at 1330.
166. See Rupp, supra note 96, at 2775-77.
167. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
168. Id. at 225 (White, J., concurring).
169. Id.
170. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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discriminatory application of the death penalty.17 The Court held
that for McCleskey to prevail on an equal protection challenge, he
would have to "prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with
discriminatory purpose, ' and he offered no such evidence.173 This
logically implies that if McCleskey could provide specific facts
showing discrimination by his particular prosecutor, he would have
prevailed on his equal protection claim. Indeed, the Court noted that
"[r]equiring a prosecutor to rebut a study that analyzes the past
conduct of scores of prosecutors is quite different from requiring a
prosecutor to rebut a contemporaneous challenge to his own acts.
1 74
The Court stated that "a prosecutor need not explain his decisions
unless the criminal defendant presents a prima facie case of
unconstitutional conduct with respect to his case." '175
McCleskey involved an equal protection claim, but its reasoning
applies equally well to an Eighth Amendment challenge based on
arbitrariness. A capital defendant should be able to prevail in an
Eighth Amendment arbitrariness challenge if he can provide enough
facts for a prima facie showing that a particular prosecutor has acted
arbitrarily in his particular case. Defendants should be entitled to
present evidence of this type of arbitrary decisionmaking in a pretrial
adversarial proceeding in order to force the prosecutor to justify his
decisions on the record, and preserve the claim for review.
The McCleskey Court concluded its opinion by noting the
essential function of discretion at all stages of the criminal justice
system in a murder trial, not just the prosecutor's charging decision:
"Implementation of these laws necessarily requires discretionary
judgments. Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice
process, we would demand exceptionally clear proof before we would
infer that the discretion has been abused." '17 6 Presumably, the Court's
pronouncement on challenges to prosecutorial discretion would apply
equally to an Eighth Amendment arbitrariness challenge as to a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge. A logical
171. Id. at 292-93. McCleskey presented as evidence David C. Baldus's sophisticated
statistical analysis of the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia as it related to race.
Id. at 286. The Baldus study found that prosecutors sought the death penalty more than
three times as often when the defendant was black and the victim white than when the
defendant was white and the victim black. Id. at 287. Regarding death sentences actually
imposed, even controlling for other variables, defendants convicted of killing white victims
were 4.3 times as likely to get the death penalty as those who killed black victims. Id.
172. Id. at 292.
173. Id. at 293.
174. Id. at 296 n.17.
175. Id. at 296 n.18.
176. Id. at 297.
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question, then, would be how the defendant can provide clear proof
that a prosecutor has abused his discretion and acted arbitrarily in his
case, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
1. Collecting and Publishing Data About All Death-Eligible Crimes
One of the main problems any defendant would face in raising a
claim of arbitrariness is that little data currently exists to support such
a claim, making it difficult, if not impossible, for a judge to
meaningfully consider the claim. 77 While many researchers have
conducted aggregate studies of death penalty decisionmaking within
an entire state, there exists very little disaggregated research available
to a defendant who is trying to prove that his particular prosecutor
has acted arbitrarily. 78 Neither Texas nor Virginia, the two states
who have executed the greatest number of people since the 1976
reinstatement of the death penalty, 79 keep any such records at all.180
177. See Vorenberg, supra note 25, at 1568 (stating that one of the main problems with
judicial review of prosecutorial decisionmaking is that judges are often "operating in the
dark").
178. Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 58, at 758 ("To obtain a complete picture of
prosecutorial discretion, a researcher would have to analyze all death-eligible offenders
from arrest through sentencing.").
179. DEBORAH FINS, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC.,
DEATH Row USA FALL 2005, at 8 (2005), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/
pdf/pubs/drusa[DRUSA Fall_2005.pdf. As of fall 2005, Texas had executed 349 people,
while Virginia had executed 94. Id.
180. See Sorensen & Marquart, supra note 58, at 758 (Texas); see also ACLU OF VA.,
supra note 133, at 9 ("No statewide records are kept on the frequency with which
individual Virginia prosecutors seek death sentences."). In this report, the Virginia
ACLU recommends that "[e]very county attorney's office should keep statistics on every
potentially capital case in Virginia, including race, ethnicity, gender, and age of the victim
and offender." Id. at 25. Note that the federal death penalty protocol, see supra note 154,
formerly required the United States Attorney to submit a "death penalty evaluation form"
only when she intended to request permission to seek the death penalty. See FEDERAL
DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM, supra note 154 (click on "Part IV.A: Broadening the Scope of
the Process"). The Department of Justice's revised process now requires the form in all
potentially capital cases, including when the U.S. Attorney does not intend to seek the
death penalty. Id. The form must include "gender, race, and ethnicity information for
defendants and victims, the charges against the defendant, and the reasons the United
States Attorney decided not to seek the death penalty or charge a capital offense." Id.
The purpose of gathering the broader information, according to the Department of
Justice, is to "maintain public confidence in the system by making more complete racial
and ethnic data available for both actual and potential federal capital cases." Id.
Additionally, two states require similar data collection: Nevada requires a report to the
state supreme court on all cases that included a murder or voluntary manslaughter charge,
see NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.750 (LexisNexis 1996), while Washington requires a
report to the state supreme court on all cases where the defendant was convicted of
aggravated first-degree murder, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.120 (West 2002).
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Therefore, the first step in instituting a process by which
defendants could present proof of arbitrariness in an adversarial
proceeding would be to require that all prosecutors keep and publish
detailed records about every homicide case the office handles. This
record should include as many of the relevant facts of the case as
practicable, including a summary of the facts of the crime, the race,
ethnicity, gender, and age of the defendant(s) and victim(s), as well as
any aggravating or mitigating circumstances the prosecutor has
considered when making a decision whether to seek the death
penalty. The record should also include the ultimate disposition of
the case, including whether the prosecutor decided to charge capital
murder (where it exists), first-degree murder, second-degree murder
or some other lesser offense; whether the prosecutor struck a plea
bargain with the defendant; whether the prosecutor decided to pursue
the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, or some other
lesser sentence; whether the case went to trial; and the ultimate
outcome of the trial, including whether the prosecutor withdrew any
intent to seek the death penalty before the penalty phase proceedings
began. Finally, the prosecutor should state, in this record, his reasons
for selecting a particular sentencing disposition.
The value of such data would be immeasurable, not only to
defendants seeking to prove arbitrariness, but also to the legislature
as it attempts to evaluate the effectiveness of its statutory
imperatives. 18' For defendants and reviewing judges, these data
would help create a universe of decisions to which each subsequent
death penalty decision can be compared for consistency. 8 2 As such, a
181. See Misner, supra note 25, at 770-71; Vorenberg, supra note 25, at 1567.
182. See Vorenberg, supra note 25, at 1570 ("Given ... post hoc reporting by
prosecutors, courts could determine whether particular charging or bargaining decisions
were consistent with the prosecutor's general pattern, fell within specific, previously
announced exceptions, or were instances of prosecutorial thoughtlessness or
vindictiveness."). Vorenberg discusses prosecutorial discretion in general, rather than
death penalty decisions specifically. But again, the same rationale applies. He does note
some of the practical and tactical difficulties of maintaining such a record, including the
added burden of actually creating and keeping the records, as well as the need for
protecting the identity of individuals against whom charges were "considered but not
brought." Id. at 1566. Vorenberg addresses the first concern by noting that the burden of
keeping records is outweighed by the need for transparency in prosecutorial
decisionmaking. Id. The need for consistent decisions is even greater in the death penalty
area, as has been discussed at length elsewhere in this Comment. Vorenberg addresses the
latter concern by stating that the necessary information involves the prosecutor's
decisionmaking process, not the identity of the individuals, which could therefore be
redacted. Id. The concern about protecting the privacy of individuals would be reduced
in the death penalty arena, for the decisions at issue here are whether to charge a murder
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defendant could use the data to make a prima facie case of
arbitrariness, if, for example, the facts of his case are plainly similar
to, or appear to be less aggravating than, facts of another case where
the prosecutor ultimately opted not to charge the death penalty. 83
2. Using a Three-Step Adversarial Process for Pretrial Arbitrariness
Analysis
Once armed with this kind of data, a defendant should be
entitled to use the traditional adversarial process to challenge the
prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty against him. As the
Supreme Court stated in McCleskey, "[r]equiring a prosecutor to
rebut a study that analyzes the past conduct of scores of prosecutors is
quite different from requiring a prosecutor to rebut a
contemporaneous challenge to his own acts."'" Here, the Court
references its opinion in Batson v. Kentucky,' s in which it laid out a
three-part test for a defendant attempting to prove that the
prosecutor had been racially discriminatory in exercising peremptory
challenges, or challenges without cause, against prospective jurors in
the defendant's particular case."8 6  Batson's three-step process
operates as follows: first, the defendant must establish a prima facie
showing of racial discrimination in the prosecutor's peremptory
challenges, and may use all relevant circumstances of the case to do
so; second, if the defendant successfully raises a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide race-neutral reasons to
justify each peremptory challenge; and third, the trial court must
determine whether, given all the evidence, purposeful discrimination
occurred.s7
capitally, not whether to charge at all. Thus the identity of the defendant is likely already
public.
183. Professor Vorenberg discusses the use of published general prosecutorial
guidelines in making a prima facie case of overbroad discretion and argues that having
published guidelines would ease the burden of proof on the defendant claiming arbitrary
charging. See id. at 1564. He states that a prosecutor's failure to follow his own guidelines
could itself be a prima facie case of arbitrariness or, at the very least, would give the
defendant leverage with which to negotiate a plea bargain. Id. Again, while Vorenberg's
analysis is of prosecutorial discretion in general, his argument applies equally to capital
prosecutions. If a capital defendant could make a showing that a prosecutor has failed to
follow a documented pattern of decisionmaking, it could at least be enough to shift the
burden to the prosecutor to justify his decision with a legally relevant reason. See infra
notes 188-89 and accompanying text. And similarly, at the least, a defendant could use
the past practices as a plea bargaining tool in order to receive a sentence less than death.
184. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296 n.17 (1986).
185. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
186. Id. at 96-98.
187. Id.
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Again, the process used in the equal protection realm could work
similarly in the arbitrariness realm. A capital defendant wishing to
prove arbitrary charging of the death penalty should be entitled to
prove that the particular prosecutor in his case is seeking the death
penalty on arbitrary grounds. The defendant should have the right,
prior to his trial, to challenge the prosecutor's decision to seek the
death penalty in his particular case. The procedure to make such a
challenge would operate as follows: first, at an ordinary pretrial
motions hearing,188 the defendant would compare the facts of his
particular case with the record of the prosecutor's past charging
decisions in order to raise a prima facie case of arbitrariness. If the
trial court determined that the defendant successfully raised a prima
facie case, either because the facts of his case were substantially
similar to, or in fact less aggravating than, the facts of a prior case or
cases, then the burden would shift to the prosecutor to state, on the
record, the factors that distinguish this case from those past cases
where the prosecutor came to a different conclusion about the death-
worthiness of the crime. This burden would require the prosecutor to
justify his decision by articulating only legally relevant reasons for
seeking the death penalty in the case. The trial court would then
determine whether, given the evidence presented by both sides, the
prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty in the defendant's
case was inherently arbitrary.
Using a process akin to the Batson analysis would be appropriate
in assessing whether the prosecutor has arbitrarily applied the death
penalty in a particular defendant's case. First, peremptory challenges
have traditionally been an area where attorneys have been given
great discretion. 89  Discretion is inherent in the nature of the
peremptory challenge, as it allows an attorney to challenge a juror
without showing any cause for doing so. Thus, there is Supreme
Court precedent for a process intended to limit the prosecutor's
discretion when it is being exercised unconstitutionally.
Furthermore, the suggested method employs the adversarial
process to impose limits on prosecutorial discretion, thereby
removing a significant factor in the concern about separation of
powers between the judiciary and the executive branch that has made
188. A pretrial hearing might typically encompass a series of preliminary motions,
including motions to suppress certain evidence, motions to sever defendants, and motions
for discovery. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b).
189. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 213-21 (1965) (discussing the roots in English
common law of peremptory challenges and the expansive role of the peremptory challenge
in American jury selection).
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judicial review of prosecutors' decisions unpalatable in the past.19
Such a procedure would also preserve the tradition of prosecutorial
discretion, because this process would not totally remove the
discretion of the prosecutor to make charging decisions-it would
simply ensure that those decisions were based on legally relevant
factors, therefore bringing the prosecutor's decisions within the
confines of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty. Prosecutors would be forced to be
even more selective, thorough, and consistent when reviewing the
facts of each case before deciding whether to pursue a capital charge.
Such a process obviously would not be without flaws or
obstacles. First, because the process only works to challenge the
decisions within one prosecutorial office, it would not cure all of the
disparities previously discussed, such as those resulting from different
county budgets across a state or the political leanings of a particular
prosecutor's constituency. 9' However, the process could operate to
constrain one prosecutor's political use of the death penalty in an
election year, for example, or an inconsistent use of the death penalty
resulting from fluctuating annual budgets. The process would still
operate to curtail arbitrary decisionmaking resulting from
consideration of the identity of the victim or the quality of the
defendant's lawyers.
The proposed process is also imperfect because the majority of
state court judges are also elected officials, just like prosecutors.192
Thus, one could argue that the adversarial process described above
would ultimately shift the decision about whether or not to seek the
death penalty onto the shoulders of yet another public officer subject
to the same political and public pressures with which this Comment is
concerned. While this is indeed a valid concern, the process will, at
190. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
191. To further supplement the efficacy of this proposed process and address some of
these other disparities, state legislatures might also consider restraining prosecutorial
discretion by significantly narrowing the class of death-eligible offenses by eliminating
overly broad aggravating factors, see supra note 56 (discussing Professor Rosen's
comments on the overly broad "heinous, atrocious, and cruel" aggravating factor); see also
Kirchmeier, supra note 52, at 363-74 (discussing the overbreadth and vagueness of the
"heinous, atrocious and cruel" and "future danger" aggravating factors). States might also
consider reforming requirements for charging the death penalty in felony murder cases.
David McCord, State Death Sentencing for Felony Murder Accomplices Under the Enmund
and Tison Standards, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 843, 893-96 (2000) (proposing several reforms to
reduce the improper use of the death penalty in certain felony murder cases).
192. See Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death:
Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV.
759, 777-78 (1995).
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the very least, create a vital record of prosecutorial decisions and
state court judges' reactions to them, which federal courts may later
consider in habeas corpus proceedings as well. While federal judges
are not entirely insulated from the political process,'93 their lifetime
appointments do protect them from "the threat of being voted out of
office for an unpopular decision," '194 and they are thus less susceptible
to the kind of political pressure that elected state prosecutors and
judges may face when making death penalty decisions.
Furthermore, in the McCleskey decision, the United States
Supreme Court was very reluctant to inquire into prosecutors'
decisions whether to seek the death penalty. 95 In its recitation of the
procedural history of the case, the Court cited, seemingly with
approval, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in the matter:
The very exercise of discretion means that persons exercising
discretion may reach different results from exact duplicates.
Assuming each result is within the range of discretion, all are
correct in the eyes of the law. It would not make sense for the
system to require the exercise of discretion in order to be
facially constitutional, and at the same time hold a system
unconstitutional in application where that discretion achieved
different results for what appear to be exact duplicates, absent
the state showing the reasons for the difference ....
However, in its later analysis of McCleskey's claim, the Court made
its own statement that "[t]he Constitution is not offended by
inconsistency in results based on the objective circumstances of the
crime. Numerous legitimate factors may influence the outcome of a
trial and a defendant's ultimate sentence, even though they may be
irrelevant to his actual guilt."'97  Implicit in this statement is the
Court's incorrect assumption, like that of Justice White in Gregg v.
Georgia ten years before, that prosecutors base their death penalty
decisions on wholly objective criteria.19 Given the evidence that this
193. Id. at 789-90 (discussing the potential importance of a nominee's votes on the
death penalty in the process of appointment to the federal bench).
194. Id. at 816.
195. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987); see also supra notes 28-42 and
accompanying text for discussion of the Court's position on prosecutorial discretion and
the death penalty. Note that the Court decided McCleskey after Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986).
196. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 289-90 (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 898-99
(11th Cir. 1985)).
197. Id. at 307 n.28.
198. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 225 (1976) (White, J., concurring).
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assumption is indeed wrong, if the exercise of discretion reaches
different results based on exact duplicates, the only possible
inferences that may be drawn are that either some extralegal factor
played a role in the decision, or that the decision is simply inherently
arbitrary. Neither possibility withstands Eighth Amendment scrutiny.
Thus, if a defendant can make a showing, using data about the
prosecutor's prior decisions, that the exercise of discretion in his
particular case was potentially arbitrary, then the state should be
required to rebut that showing with legally relevant factors that made
the difference in the defendant's case.
CONCLUSION
While the exercise of discretion, particularly that of the
prosecutor, is indeed a historically important element of our criminal
justice system, the qualitative difference of death as a penalty
requires that discretion to be circumscribed in order to comport with
the Eighth Amendment. While the United States Supreme Court has
recognized the need to limit the discretion of the sentencing body in
capital punishment cases, and has strictly enforced those limitations,
it has largely left the prosecutor to her own devices to determine if
and when to seek a death sentence in the first place. Prosecutors are
therefore free to consider, whether consciously or subconsciously,
legally irrelevant factors when deciding whether to pursue the death
penalty. As a result, the imposition of the death penalty remains
inherently arbitrary, with no way to predict, among all the death-
eligible cases, which defendants will face the death penalty as a
possible sentence. Such a state of affairs directly violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. The
institution of an adversarial process, through which the defendant
may demonstrate that the prosecutor has acted arbitrarily in his
particular case, would provide a legitimate method for limiting a
prosecutor's discretion to a tolerable range within the boundaries of
the Eighth Amendment, while still preserving the essential role of
that discretion in our criminal justice system.
AMANDA S. HITCHCOCK
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